Tailored emails prompt electric vehicle owners to engage with tariff switching information by Nicolson, M et al.
Whilst studies have investigated methods of increasing 
adoption of EVs1, the risks posed to the electricity network 
from charging these vehicles and, in particular, how EV 
owners could mitigate these risks has received less 
attention. This is problematic because the carbon intensity 
of the electricity used to charge an EV has as much to do 
with when in the day EV owners choose to charge their 
vehicles as it does with national fuel mixes2. Repetitive 
behaviours, such as EV charging, could become habitual 
and evidence to date shows that EV owners have got into 
the habit of charging their vehicles when they get home 
from work3–5, when electricity demand is at its peak and, in 
many countries, the least efficient and therefore most 
polluting power plants are brought into operation to meet 
peaks in demand.2 When charged consistently at the most 
polluting times, lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions from 
EVs can be nearly 50% higher than if charged at average 
electricity grid carbon intensity.2  
As EV sales and battery capacities increase, so too do 
the risks to electricity networks. Estimates suggest that UK 
electricity networks will become overloaded when EVs 
reach 30%-60% market penetration4 and that the US could 
charge 70% of all electric cars and light trucks, but only if 
charged overnight.6 The conventional solution to such 
problems is to reinforce local electricity networks funded 
through ‘green’ taxes on consumer energy bills.4 Another 
method is energy storage but storage technologies are still 
very costly7. A potentially cheaper alternative gaining 
traction amongst policymakers is to incentivise EV owners 
to charge their vehicles at times of low electricity demand 
or when renewable generation is high (demand-side 
response).6,3–5,8 Smart-meters, which record energy use in 
near real-time, will enable the creation of new types of ‘time 
of use’ electricity tariffs which charge people less for 
electricity used at off-peak times (static time of use tariffs) 
or when renewables are more abundant (dynamic time of 
use tariffs). However, like other pro-environmental actions, 
the financial savings to the individual customer from 
switching to these tariffs are relatively modest8 and 
mounting evidence suggests that voluntary uptake will be 
lower than required unless action is taken to prompt EV 
owners to switch.9–11  
Here, we present results from a randomised control trial 
testing whether recipients of the UK Government EV grant 
could be prompted to consider switching tariff by sending 
them an email reminder shortly after purchasing their EV, 
when they are already likely to be thinking about the costs 
of running their new vehicle. The behavioural science 
literature12–14 suggests that EV owners will be more 
susceptible to behaviour change interventions at this point 
in time, particularly if the email is tailored to them as EV 
owners.15–20 The trial involved over 7,000 EV owners and, 
to our knowledge, is the largest trial run on EV owners.  
The first key finding is that governments need to act 
soon, in the early days of the transition towards EVs; 
consistent with the habit discontinuity hypothesis12–14 (that 
people are more susceptible to information delivered in the 
context of life changes), email open rates decline from over 
70% to 40% for recipients who have owned their EV for 
over three months, equivalent to missing out on reaching an 
extra one million people once EVs reach 60% market 
penetration. The second key finding is that the framing of 
information is crucial; most tariff switching campaigns 
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emphasise the energy bill savings from switching tariff 
however we find that EV owners are much more receptive 
to prompts which frame the savings as a reduction in home-
charging costs, even though the monetary value of the 
savings presented (up to £300) were identical. The same 
method could also be applied in other countries with EV 
incentive schemes. Our results demonstrate the importance 
of early government intervention and that even low cost 
interventions such as sending a timely, tailored email to EV 
owners has the potential to increase enrolment rates to 
energy tariffs that incentivise EV owners to charge their 
vehicles at times of the day associated with lowest 
emissions. 
Nudge: going beyond opt-out enrolment 
Given the unpopularity of government mandates, support is 
growing for a policy of automatically enrolling people onto 
time of use tariffs, including EV owners, unless they 
explicitly request not to be enrolled.21,22 Interventions 
which influence behaviour without using mandates, bans or 
significantly changing the underlying economic incentives 
are called ‘nudges’23. So-called ‘default’ or ‘opt-out’ 
nudges10,11 are highly effective at increasing recruitment 
rates into pension schemes24, organ donor registers25 as well 
as ‘green’ energy tariffs (tariffs with a higher renewable 
fuel mix)10,11. However, critics26 as well as proponents27,28 
of default enrolment argue that it should only be used when 
there is a clear, single optimal course of action that can be 
favoured by making it the default.26 Unlike company 
pensions, the best tariff for an EV owner (whether flat-rate 
or time varying) will vary depending on the individual’s 
charging needs. Although, in principle, a personalised 
default rule27 could be designed for every EV owner in the 
population, doing so would be challenging in practice, 
making it preferable, from a consumer welfare perspective, 
that time of use tariffs be offered to consumers on an opt-in 
basis. For example, a leading explanation for the 
effectiveness of defaults is that people are inattentive to the 
default option.26 Indeed, consumers automatically enrolled 
on time of use tariffs reduce their peak electricity 
consumption by substantially less than those who actively 
switch29,30, thus increasing, rather than decreasing, their 
energy bill. However, auto-enrolment into schemes in 
which a third party remotely switches off/on EV charge 
points to manage charging demand risks leaving consumers 
with half-charged cars when they need them.  In the absence 
of default mechanisms, what can be done to encourage large 
numbers of EV owners to actively switch to time of use 
tariffs?  
To answer this question, we draw on evidence from 
behavioural science31 which suggests that email would be 
an effective mechanism by which EV owners could be 
prompted to switch electricity tariff. First, evidence 
suggests that EV owners will be more responsive to 
prompts delivered shortly after purchasing their EV, before 
they have developed strong habits over the timing of their 
charging13,14,32. This is based on the habit discontinuity 
hypothesis which predicts that people are more susceptible 
to behaviour change campaigns shortly after they have 
engaged in other life changes, such as moving home.12–14,32 
The assumption is that, “when habits are (temporarily) 
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Figure 1 | Experimental procedure. Diagram showing the process by which data on electric vehicle owners were obtained, through to randomisation to assignments and collection of outcomes. 
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disturbed, people are more sensitive to new information and 
adopt a mind-set that is conducive to behaviour change”13 
(p.1). Although buying a new car may not be as significant a 
life transition as moving home, purchasing an EV incurs 
significant financial costs and requires non-trivial changes 
in usage relative to traditional internal combustion engine 
vehicles.  
Second, although information-based appeals are easy to 
ignore, contrary to rational-choice theories, people are 
much less likely to disregard information that is tailored20 
to them, suggesting that an EV-specific tariff switching 
campaign would be more effective than a generic broadcast 
campaign. This is based on the assumption that tailoring, 
the process of “enhancing the relevance and salience of 
information”18, p.187 increases motivation to process 
information, making behaviour change more likely.  
Study design and participant recruitment 
To test these hypotheses, we carried out a large randomised 
control trial (n=7038) with the UK Government Office for 
Low Emission Vehicles (OLEV), the department 
responsible for administrating the Plug-In Car Grant 
(PICG). The PICG automatically deducts up to £5,000 from 
the sale price of eligible EVs. The data associated with these 
grants contains the email address and date of purchase of 
nearly all EV owners in the UK. Since the grant is 
automatically awarded to recipients at the point of sale and 
over 95% of EVs bought in the UK are grant-eligible 
models33, our dataset encompasses nearly all private 
purchase EV owners in the UK and approximately 10% of 
total UK EV owners (the remainder are fleet EVs and EVs 
purchased by leasing companies – see Methods for more 
details).  
As illustrated in Fig. 1 recipients of the grant were 
randomly assigned to receive one of two emails prompting 
them to switch electricity tariff. The benefits of switching 
were framed in terms of either: (1) saving £300 on their 
household energy bills (generic email); or (2) reducing the 
cost of charging their EV by £300 (tailored email). Both 
emails were sent from a UK Government for Low 
Emissions Vehicles email address and encouraged 
recipients to visit a webpage containing tips on how to cut 
the cost of their household energy bills (generic email) or 
cut the cost of home charging (tailored email) – see 
Supplementary Table 1 for details.  
The email and tips included a time of use tariff which 
has a cheaper rate overnight, when electricity demand is 
lowest and renewable generation (i.e. wind) is highest. 
Balance checks on baseline characteristics reveal that the 
randomisation was successful (see Supplementary Table 2 
for the results of these tests).Following best practice from 
medical trials, all analyses except three were specified in 
advance within a pre-analysis plan (egap trial registration 
number 20160726AA) to avoid concerns about arbitrary 
‘specification searching’ – see Supplementary Methods for 
details.  
Figure 2 | Proportion of email recipients opening email and clicking-
through to online advice page by experimental condition. Error bars 
represent standard errors, calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the 
square root of the sample size. The bar labels represent the sample size opening 
or clicking through in each group. 
Figure 3 | Proportion of email recipients opening email by the time in 
months since the recipient purchased their electric vehicle. Error bars 
represent standard errors, calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the 
square root of the sample size. Outliers removed (see Supplementary 
Information).  
Email open rates and tailored messaging effects 
Email open and click-through rates were high, with over 
40% of recipients (n=3,102) opening the email, compared 
to an industry average for email communication of just 
22%34, and 15% clicking-through (n=1,027) to the advice 
webpage (industry average >3%)34. Moreover, as shown in 
Fig. 2. and as predicted, open rates were 15% higher 
(p<0.001) and click-through rates 90% higher (p<0.001) 
amongst participants who were prompted to switch to cut 
the costs of charging their EV by £300 (tailored email) 
rather than cutting the cost of their energy bill by £300 
(generic email).  
Although recipients could unsubscribe from future emails 
by clicking a link at the bottom of the email, very few did so 
(n=59); significantly fewer unsubscribed in the tailored 
email relative to the generic email (p<0.05). Over 1,000 
users downloaded the guides on the Energy Saving Trust 
website in the first week, equivalent to one download for 
every three people who opened the email. Although it was 
not possible to link the interventions to the downloads, it 
seems likely that a higher proportion will have been made 
by those in the tailored condition because 90% more people 
visited the webpage in this condition than the generic email 
condition; however, the data do not allow us to confirm this 
hypothesis. 
Testing the habit discontinuity effect 
Some participants had purchased their EV as recently as 
three months prior to receiving the email whereas others 
had owned their vehicle for over five years. In line with 
our pre-analysis plan, regression analysis was used to test 
whether willingness to consider switching tariff declines 
the longer ago the recipient purchased their EV (the habit 
discontinuity effect), in which time in months since 
purchasing the EV is regressed against the email open rate 
(binary 1=yes; 0=no).  
Consistent with the habit discontinuity hypothesis, the 
regression revealed a small but statistically significant 
negative coefficient, implying that email open rates 
slightly decrease as time since purchasing an EV increases 
(c=-0.004, p<0.05) including in a further robustness check 
Throughout all models, the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether the recipient opened the email. Model 1 reports results of a pre-specified 
logit regression in which the independent variable is time in months since the recipient purchased their EV from the date of the email being sent, with no controls.  
Model 2 reports the results of a logit regression in which the independent variable is the log transformation of time in months since the recipient purchased their 
EV, with no control variables. Model 3 reports results of a pre-specified logit regression in which the independent variable, time in months since purchasing the 
vehicle, has been split into quartiles. Model 4 reports the results of a logit regression in which the independent variable is a dummy variable which takes on the 
value one if the recipient received their EV three months ago and zero if the recipient received their EV four months or more ago, with no control variables. Model 
5 reports the results of a robustness check using the same specification as Model 4 but which includes a series of control variables collected at the time of purchase: 
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mileage. The sample size in Model 5 is smaller because there are missing observations for the covariates, however a further robustness check which includes only 
controls for missing variables provides similar results. All regressions were estimated with robust standard errors. Traditional p-values reported in brackets (however 
the p-values on both dummy specifications withstand corrections to account for multiple hypothesis testing using the Benjamini and Hochberg35 method).  
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
 
 
using the log transformation of time since purchase in 
months to account for the rightwards skew in EV sales (c=-
0.105, p<0.01). See Table 1 for the full regression output 
from this analysis.  
However, as predicted, visual inspection of the data 
(Fig. 3) reveals a marked non-linearity in this relationship, 
suggesting that, consistent with prior studies13,14, there is a 
discrete ‘window of opportunity’ for influencing 
behaviour; email open rates decline from over 70% to 40% 
between those who had purchased their EV three months 
ago (the most recent group of EV owners in the dataset) 
and those who had purchased their EV four months ago or 
more (Fig. 3). Consistent with our pre-analysis plan, we 
split the sample into quartiles based on the time in months 
since purchase and regressed this against open rates, to 
also find a statistically significant negative coefficient (c=-
0.048, p<0.05), in support of the habit discontinuity effect.  
To test whether the sharp decrease in open rates 
between the third and fourth month since purchase is 
statistically significant – i.e. whether this represents a 
genuine ‘window of opportunity’ for encouraging EV 
owners to switch tariff – an additional logit regression was 
run in which the independent variable is a dummy 
indicating whether the recipient received their EV three 
months since the email was sent (1) or more than three 
months since it was sent (0). As predicted, receiving a 
prompt within three months of owning an EV (n=30) has 
a strong and highly statistically significant positive effect 
on the likelihood of opening the email (c=1.395, p<0.01), 
including in a further robustness check which includes a 
battery of control variables collected at the time of 
purchase: vehicle price, vehicle type, gender, age, 
employment status, number of vehicles in the household, 
whether the EV will be the main vehicle and expected 
annual mileage (c=1.228, p<0.01). The p-values on both 
these dummy variables are robust to multiple hypothesis 
corrections using the Benjamini and Hochberg35 
procedure.  
Conclusions 
In summary, we demonstrate that policymakers could 
exploit the ‘window of opportunity’ created when people 
purchase their first EV to prompt an entire and growing sub-
group of the population to participate in demand-side 
response (using electricity when generation is cleaner and 
cheaper but overall demand lower). To our knowledge, this 
is the largest and only population-wide study on EV owners 
and the only study to test a method of encouraging EV 
owners to switch electricity tariff. By using theory to pre-
specify our data analysis and visualisation of the raw data 
to supplement our pre-specified analysis, we minimise the 
risk that we are only seeing an effect in one particular cut 
of the data, that would not be present if we cut or analysed 
the data in a different way, a practice which notoriously 
undermines the replicability of research findings36.   
The findings add weight to psychological rather than 
rational choice theories of individual decision-making and 
are therefore of relevance to the broader literature on 
climate change communication and pro-environmental 
behaviour. For example, it is often assumed that if 
consumers do not invest in energy efficient appliances or 
switch electricity tariff it is because they are unaware of the 
benefits or because the costs of switching or green 
investment are too high.37,38 This model of consumer 
decision making is based on the assumption that consumers 
are rational. However, the fact that so many more EV 
owners opened the email prompting them to switch tariff 
when framed in terms of the potential £300 reduction in 
their home charging costs rather than a £300 reduction in 
their household energy bills – and when the email was sent 
within 3 months of purchase – adds to the increasing 
evidence23 that the model of the utility maximising agent 
from classical economics is a poor approximation of how 
people actually make decisions.   
Two potential mechanisms are most likely to account for 
the impact of tailoring. The first is inattention to insalient 
costs, or myopia as proposed in Gabaix and Laibson’s39 
model. According to this model, “add on” costs are less 
salient than purchase costs and consumers do not rationally 
gather information about ‘shrouded’ costs. As argued 
elsewhere40, fuel costs (e.g. the cost of charging an EV) are 
analogous to “add on” costs in that, unlike the purchase 
price, they are not explicitly presented upfront. Many new 
EV owners may therefore not perceive themselves as 
having higher than average electricity consumption and, 
unlike the generic email, the tailored email ‘unshrouds’39 
the insalient costs of owning an EV, thereby encouraging 
EV owners to act to lower these costs. A second related 
mechanism proposed in the literature on tailored health 
communication18 is that tailoring increases the perceived 
relevance and salience of information, thereby increasing 
motivation to process and act on it, in this study, by visiting 
information about how to reduce the costs of charging an 
EV.  
Although our study was unable, for practical reasons, to 
track whether EV owners went on to switch tariff as a result 
of the prompts, theory41 and empirical evidence42 suggest 
that the intermediate outcomes measured (open rates, click-
through rates, downloads) will be correlated with switching; 
even if just 5 percent of those who open the email switch 
tariff, that could mean an additional 135,000 EV owners 
switching tariff once EVs reach 60% market penetration, at 
almost zero cost. If these email prompts focused on 
promoting time of use tariffs,  and EV owners switched from 
flat-rate to time of use tariffs, early evidence suggests that 
such tariffs could reduce peak time charging by 50%3. 
However, unlike default enrolment (the most common 
‘nudge’23), prompts do not succeed by encouraging choice 
without awareness43 and therefore increase the likelihood of 
active rather than passive participation in demand-side 
response, whereby people defaulted onto time of use tariffs 
do not substantially alter their energy consumption 
patterns.22,30  
Although this study was run on recipients of the UK 
Government’s EV grant, a number of countries (e.g. India, 
China, South Korea, Sweden, Germany, Netherlands, 
Portugal) run similar EV subsidy schemes for which contact 
data is also likely to be collected to enable the sending of 
timely, tailored email prompts. Moreover, the same 
approach could also be tested in the context of other new 
low carbon technologies such as the installation of new 
electric heating systems, which are also expected to place a 
great strain on the future electricity network44 but which are 
also subject to similar government incentive schemes. A 
key contribution of this study is to demonstrate how 
additional value can be obtained from this administrative 
data. 
Finally, this study demonstrates for the first time that the 
habit discontinuity effect applies beyond life changing 
events such as moving house. Based on our results, we 
estimate that sending an email prompt in the first three 
months of purchasing an EV could mean reaching an 
additional one million EV owners compared to sending the 
email at a later time once 60% of the population has an EV. 
We echo the calls of other researchers for the greater 
application of behavioural science to the design of 
interventions aimed at fostering positive energy 
consumption behaviours.45,46  
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